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Abstract: In the event of an accidental atmospheric release of radionuclides from a nuclear power plant, accurate real-time forecasting of the 
activity  concentrations  of  radionuclides  is  required  by the  decision  makers  for  the  preparation  of  adequate  countermeasures.  Yet,  the 
accuracy of the forecast plume is highly dependent on the source term  estimation. Inverse modelling and data assimilation techniques should 
help in that respect.
In this presentation, a semi-automatic method is proposed for the sequential reconstruction of the plume, by implementing a sequential data 
assimilation algorithm based on inverse modelling, with a care to develop realistic methods for operational risk agencies. The performance of 
the assimilation scheme has been assessed through the intercomparison between French and Finnish frameworks. Three dispersion models 
have been used: Polair3D, with or without  plume-in-grid,  both developed at CEREA, and SILAM, developed at FMI. Different release 
locations,  as well as different meteorological  situations are tested. The existing and newly planned surveillance networks are used and 
realistically large observational errors are assumed. Statistical indicators to evaluate the efficiency of the method are presented and the results 
are discussed. In addition, in the case where the power plant responsible for the accidental release is not known, robust statistical tools are 
developed and tested to discriminate candidate release sites.
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INTRODUCTION
In the event of an accidental atmospheric release of radionuclides from a nuclear power plant, decision-makers need to know 
the trajectory and the pattern of the radioactive plume in order to take adequate countermeasures, and alert the targeted 
populations. It has been demonstrated (Politis and Robertson, 2004; Bocquet, 2007; Abida and Bocquet, 2009) that the main 
forcing of the plume was the source. In this aim, inverse modelling and data assimilation methods have already shown, at 
least at an academic level, their capacity to give accurate results. For instance, they were used successfully on the real ETEX 
data (Bocquet,  2007; Krysta  et  al.,  2008),  on the Algeciras  dispersion incident (Krysta  and Bocquet,  2007) and on the 
Chernobyl accident (Davoine and Bocquet, 2007). The objective of this work is to evaluate the performance of an inverse 
modelling and data assimilation system, simple enough to be used in an operational context, but still efficient. In particular, 
the situations where such a tool may fail are investigated and solutions are proposed.
In a first section the French and the Finnish contexts, as well as the dispersion models which were used are presented. The 
second section describes a semi-automatic sequential data assimilation system, whose methodology is mainly based on the 
assumption that the accidental release comes from a nuclear power plant and that this power plant is known. This assumption 
should be realistic as the management  of nuclear power plant at risk should immediately raise an alert to authorities in 
charge. However, history has shown that this is not always the case. Besides the accident may occur on a location abroad. It 
is therefore necessary to implement statistical tests that would assess the probability of a site to be responsible for the release.  
Such Bayesian statistical tools are presented in the third section of the presentation.
FRANCE AND FINLAND CONTEXTS – SETUP OF THE MODELS
For  the  French  context,  the  whole  nuclear  facilities  are  monitored  –  i.e.  19  nuclear  power  plants  and  a  nuclear  fuel  
reprocessing plant located at La Hague. The monitoring network that we used is the one that has been proposed in (Saunier et 
al., 2009). It is built with 100 stations, which measure volumetric activity concentrations over a range of 10-5 – 109 Bq.m-3.
For the Finnish context, we have decided to monitor 6 sites. Two of them are located in Finland (one of them, Olkiluoto, 
potentially stands for two power plants as a third generation European pressurized reactor is under construction there); two 
others are in Sweden and the last two ones are in Russia. The monitoring network is the actual Finnish ambient rate dose 
monitoring network (Uljas) of 255 stations. As a simplification, we have hypothesised that the stations of the Finnish and the 
French networks are measuring activity concentrations instead of ambient dose. This assumption simplifies the method since 
the assimilation of ambient dose would require a spatial model integration, and would require to properly take into account 
contamination effects of dose instruments.
The Finnish power plants are located on the shores, and the Swedish and Russian power plants are quite far from the Finnish 
monitoring network. This situation can lead to difficulties in the inverse modelling process. This is an important difference 
with the French setup where all monitored power plants are in the national territory and therefore well surrounded by the 
measuring stations.
For each situations (France or Finland, different meteorological situations, etc.), three models are tested : First, two Eulerian 
atmospheric dispersion models : Polair3D, developed by the CEREA (Quélo et  al., 2007), and SILAM, developed by the 
FMI (Sofiev et al., 2006). In both cases, the horizontal resolution is 0.25° x 0.25°. The meteorological fields are computed 
from the reanalysis sets computed by the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF) at the same 
horizontal resolution and with a temporal resolution of three hours. The study is focussed on 137Cs. Dry deposition and wet 
scavenging are modeled. In addition, a plume-in-grid model, developed by CEREA and based on Polair3D as the Eulerian 
part of the model, is also tested.
THE SEMI-AUTOMATIC SEQUENTIAL DATA ASSIMILATION SYSTEM
The objective of such a tool is to give accurate real-time forecasting of the activity concentrations of radionuclides. As 
mentioned earlier, the accuracy of the forecast plume is highly dependent on the source identification. In a general context, 
the identification of the source concerns both geographical localization and temporal profile retrieval and implies to solve for 
a  high  number  of  unknown  parameters.  In  this  case,  inverse  modelling  methods  can  be  delicate  to  carry  out.  As  a 
simplification, our methodology assumes that the geographical origin of the source, one of the monitored power plant, is 
known.  As a consequence, the aim is to retrieve the temporal  rate profile.  For a time resolution of one hour,  this may 
represent a few hundreds parameters to solve for. This number is small compared to the potential number of observations 
regularly available from the French or the Finnish monitoring networks,  which will  allow us to sequentially update the 
Jacobian source-receptor matrix using the forward selected model. This method avoids the derivation of the adjoint model, 
which is of utter importance in the frame of an operational context since deriving the adjoint model can sometimes be a 
technological challenge.
In broad outline, our semi-automatic sequential system consists of three main steps :
 Data assimilation
At time t = tobs, the Jacobian source-receptor matrix has been built up from sequential computations from initial time t0, to tobs. 
This is the time when a new set of observations is available and data assimilation is processed.
 Inverse modelling
Inverse modelling is then performed and gives a retrieved temporal profile for the source between t0 and tobs.
 Forecasting
The source-receptor matrix is updated, containing now information on the period of desired forecast, i.e. between tobs and 
tobs + tforecast. During this time period, the source is assumed to be persistent, and the forecast of the concentrations field at t obs + 
tforecast is performed.
To evaluate the efficiency of this system, we have generated several sets of synthetic experiments with our models, using 
lognormally distributed errors,  whose  amplitudes are taken significant  and realistic for  an atmospheric  tracer dispersion 
event. Then, the sequential data assimilation method is performed, assuming that errors are normally distributed with an error 
standard deviation proportional to the measurements.
With this methodology, we have realized several studies, varying the context : France or Finland, Polair3D or SILAM, the 
meteorology for a fixed power plant, the power plants for a single meteorological set of conditions, etc.
To compare the reference and the retrieved field (the source rate profile as well as the concentration field of radionuclides), 
we use several statistical indicators that will be indicated and discussed in the presentation. The visual pattern of the plume 
can also be interesting in an operational situation.
Figure 1. Sequential plume forecast for a fictitious accident occurring at the Golfech power plant (France). The first row gives the reference 
plume knowing the true source term. The second row gives the forecasted plume, using the data assimilation scheme, not knowing the 
source. The indicated time is the time of observation. The forecast time extend is 3h after the time of observation. The unit is Bq.m-3.
BAYESIAN TESTS FOR THE DISCRIMINATION OF SOURCES
In  the case where  the site  of  the accidental  release is  unknown,  at  least  two alternative  solutions exist.  First,  one can 
complement the operational data assimilation system with a more complex system that does not assume that the location of 
the source is known (such as in Bocquet, 2007). Another solution consists in implementing some statistical tests that would 
calculate  the  probability  for  a  site  to  be  responsible  for  the  accidental  release.  In  the  same  constant  quest  for  easily 
implementable tools, the second option was chosen in this study.  We have implemented different Bayesian tests to help 
discriminating which site is responsible for the release. These tests mainly differ from each other by the prior assumption that 
is made on the source rate profile. These tests generally give accurate results, even in situations where the inverse modelling,  
knowing the release location, was difficult. Figure 2 shows a Bayesian test in such a critical case.
Figure 2. Sequential evolution of the likelihood for each site to be responsible
 for the release, according to one of our Bayesian indicators. 
The actual release occurs at the Kalinin power plant. 
CONCLUSION
In this study, a semi-automatic data assimilation system is implemented to sequentially forecast radioactive plumes in the 
event  of  accidental  releases  of  radionuclides.  The  constant  objective  is  to  propose  tools  easily  implementable  in  an 
operational situation, and still efficient. The system presents very good average performances. Nevertheless, the situations 
where the system may fail  (critical situations in an operational aspect) have been carefully investigated,  and alternative 
complementary solutions have been implemented to help in these cases. Additionally, some Bayesian statistical tests have 
also been proposed to  help identifying  the site  responsible  for  the release,  giving  very accurate  results  in  most  of  the 
situations.
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